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RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following responses to SLW's "Statement of Facts" correspond numerically to
those enumerated by SLW. These responses are necessary to show that SLW's facts are
either in dispute or attempt to introduce extrinsic evidence in order to affirm the trial court's
decision to grant SLW's Motion for Summary Judgement.
1.

SLW's references to the purchase of the premises are inadmissible extrinsic

evidence, and should not be considered for purposes of this appeal.
2.

The "Purchase Agreement" referred to in paragraph 2 is extrinsic evidence and

should not be considered for purposes of this appeal. This Purchase Agreement was also
introduced to the trial court on SLW's Motion for Summary Judgment, to which introduction
the Griffiths objected. Griffiths' Reply Memorandum, R. 113-119. This objection was never
addressed by the trial court. This extrinsic evidence is not admissible to uphold the decision
of the trial court.
3.

The Griffiths incorporate response no. 2 as if fully set forth herein. The

Purchase Agreement is extrinsic evidence.
4.

The Griffiths incorporate response no. 2 as if fully set forth herein. The

Purchase Agreement is extrinsic evidence.
5.

Paragraph 5 mischaracterizes the statements made by Jerry Griffiths in his

affidavit. The Griffiths found out this information during the course of the lease, after they

iv

had moved onto the premises. See (First) Affidavit of Jerry Griffiths, p.2, R. at 45. This
statement is therefore disputed by the Griffiths.
7.

SLW is correct that all facts must be determined in favor of the Griffiths.

However, SLW's footnote to this statement is improper and untrue. The timing of the
problems experienced with the roof of the premises is genuinely disputed by the parties.
Compare (First) Affidavit of Jerry Griffiths, p.2, R. at 145, to Affidavit of Scott Schirmer,
p.2, R. at 91.
8.

SLW's statement that, "the roof required total restoration or replacement in

order for it to be kept in repair or put into repair", is not a statement of fact, but a conclusory
argument. This statement is inappropriate, and is also disputed by the Griffiths.
11.

The Griffiths dispute that the Lease Agreement "unqualifiedly" requires

maintenance and repair. Rather, as argued to the trial court and in the Griffiths Appellate
Brief, Article 4.2 of the Lease Agreement qualifies and modifies the duty to repair. See
Griffiths' Appellate Brief, pp.26-32.
13.

The statement made by SLW in paragraph 13 is not a fact, but a conclusion of

law. Furthermore, this contention is disputed by the Griffiths.

v

ARGUMENT
L

EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE WAS UTILIZED BY THE TRIAL
COURT, AND SUCH EVIDENCE WAS DISPUTED. THIS
RENDERS THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IMPROPER.

The Griffiths have noted controlling Utah law which unequivocally states that, ffwhen
contract interpretation will be determined by extrinsic evidence of intent, it becomes a
question of fact". Records v. Briggs. 887 P.2d 864, 871 (Utah App. 1994). In their Appellate
Brief, the Griffiths argued that the trial court ignored this rule of contract interpretation by
allowing extrinsic evidence to alter the terms of the contract itself. SLW argues that the trial
court did not utilize extrinsic evidence in its analysis, and therefore followed the proper rules
of contract interpretation.
SLW's analysis is belied, however, by the language used by the trial court in its
opinion, and by the arguments made by SLW in its memoranda submitted to the trial court
as well as in its Appellate Brief. The language utilized by the trial court, and that used by
SLW itself, affirm two of the Griffiths' contentions: 1) that the trial court took into account
extrinsic evidence in its decision to grant SLW's motion for summary judgment, and; 2) that
SLW cannot put forth an argument sustaining the trial court's decision without resort to
extrinsic evidence.
"[W]hen [a] trial court relies on extrinsic evidence to interpret a contract, [the]
appellate court can affirm summary judgment only if the undisputed material facts,
concerning parties' intent, demonstrate [the] successful litigant's position is correct as a
1

matter of law". Records v. Briggs. 887 P.2d at 871(emphasis added), citing Fashion Place
Inv.. Ltd. v. Salt Lake County/Salt Lake County Medical Health. 776 P.2d 941, 943 (Utah
App. 1989) cert denied 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989). See also R & R Energies v. Mother Earth
Industries. Inc., 936 P.2d 1068 (When contract is unambiguous, intention of parties must be
determined from words of agreement.) The trial court in this case did not make clear that it
did not take into account extrinsic evidence. Indeed, it would have been simple enough for
the trial court to do so, by expressly ruling on the Griffiths' objection to the introduction of
extrinsic evidence by SLW. Instead, the trial court began its very brief opinion with the
statement that:
The plaintiff contends that it is not liable because this is a net lease and that,
as such, the landlord will only receive a fixed rent without any other charges.
R. at 215.
Whether the Lease Agreement was a "net" lease was directly disputed by the parties,
and an answer to this question cannot be found within the terms of the Lease Agreement
itself. Rather, to prove the Lease Agreement was a "net" lease, SLW introduced extrinsic
evidence to show the "real" intentions of the parties, and what the Lease Agreement "really"
meant - that "repair" actually meant "replace". See SLW's Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgement and in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for
Summary Judgment, R. at 71-84. Each allegation of extrinsic facts made by SLW to prove
the parties intended a "net" lease was disputed by the Griffiths. See Griffiths' Reply
Memorandum, pp. 8-14, R. 113-119.
2

After incorporating this "net" lease language into its opinion, without any remark as
to the Griffiths' objection to such language, the trial court went on to state that there were,
"no material facts in dispute", and found that, "as a matter of law...the phrase [tenant shall
maintain and keep in repair and shall put in repair, when necessary, a wall and roof of the
building] is clear and unambiguous...[and] it seems to me the only other meaning that the
phrase has is to replace...". R. at 215 (emphasis added).
The trial court could not have reached this conclusion without considering - and, in
fact, believing as true - SLW's extrinsic evidence as to the "real" intentions of the parties to
create a "net" lease. That the trial court did so is evident in a number of ways. First, SLW's
argument that a "net" lease was intended was incorporated into the trial court's decision as
laid out above. Second, SLW's briefs to the trial court were replete with references to
extrinsic evidence in an attempt to show that the parties meant something other than "repair".
Third, the trial court made no ruling on the Griffiths' objections to such evidence. Fourth,
the trial court found that "repair" had to mean something "other" than "repair". If the Lease
Agreement was truly "unambiguous" as found by the trial court, the trial court simply did not
have the liberty to redefine "repair" as something "other" than its ordinary meaning and
usage. Under the rules of contract interpretation, such liberties could only be taken if
undisputed extrinsic evidence showed that this was actually the parties' intention. Records
\^Bnggs, 887P.2dat871.

3

SLW is apparently unable to defend the decision of the trial court without continuing
references to extrinsic evidence in its Appellate Brief. SLW relies upon extrinsic evidence
in the following ways: 1) SLW has repeatedly argued its position based upon a Purchase
Agreement, which is not part of the Lease Agreement, at pages 3, 4, 7, 27, and 32 of its
Appellate Brief; 2) SLW apparently feels compelled to advance extrinsic "evidence" that
Jerry Griffiths purportedly could foresee that the roof might require replacement during the
term of the Lease Agreement at p. 28 of its Appellate Brief; and 3) SLW cannot resist
offering other "evidence" as to the parties' intentions, at pages 4, 7, 27, 28, and 32 of its
Appellate Brief. This extrinsic evidence is used by SLW to attempt to sustain the trial court's
interpretation. However, such evidence is not only disputed, but impermissibly interferes
with the interpretation of a purportedly "unambiguous" document.

SLW cannot show that

extrinsic evidence was not utilized by the trial court in its interpretation of the Lease
Agreement in question. Instead, all evidence shows that the trial court did indeed consider
such evidence, and, in fact, believed such evidence in favor of SLW. This led the trial court
to alter or redefine the meaning of "repair" - precisely what SLW argued for in its briefs to
the trial court. This was impermissible as a matter of law. The trial court must either ignore
all such evidence, or in the event that such evidence is disputed, allow the parties to present
such issues at trial. Since neither occurred here, the decision of the trial court should be
reversed.

4

n.

THE TRIAL COURT MISINTERPRETED THE LEASE AGREEMENT.

The Griffiths argued in their Appellate Brief that even if the trial court had not
impermissibly used extrinsic evidence in its decision to grant SLW's motion for summary
judgment, the trial court nevertheless misinterpreted the Lease Agreement as a matter of law.
SLWfs argument against this contention consists mainly of citations to nineteenth century
literature and attempts to distinguish the case law cited by the Griffiths1 in nonsensical ways.
Neither of these responses succeeds in upholding the trial court's decision to redefine "repair"
as "to replace". Therefore, this Court should overturn the trial court's decision.
As shown here and in the Griffiths' Appellate Brief, the trial court was simply not
entitled to redefine either "maintain", "put in repair" or "keep in repair" as "replace" unless
the parties intended these words to have a meaning other than their normal usage. As the
Griffiths have discussed, supra, any such intentions are directly disputed, and cannot serve
to uphold the trial court's grant of SLW's motion for summary judgment. Since the intentions
of the parties cannot change the terms of the contract, these terms must be given their
ordinary and usual meaning. Warburton v. Va. Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan, 899 P.2d 779, 782
(Utah App. 1995). If there is any question as to what these terms mean, such question must
be answered in favor of the Griffiths, because SLW wrote the Lease Agreement in question,
Sears v. Riemersma. 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982), and because all facts must be answered in
favor of the nonmovant upon a motion for summary judgment. Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp.
v. Clark. 755 P.2d 750, 752.

5

The Griffiths cited numerous cases which state that a covenant to repair - in whatever
form - does not translate as a duty to make replacements. See, e.g., Sandleman v. Buckeye
Realty, Inc.. 576 N.E.2d 1038 (111. App. 1991); Mobil Oil Credit Corp. v. DST Realty. Inc..
689 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. App. 1985); Scott v. Prazma. 555 P.2d 571 (Wyo. 1976); Expert Corp.
v. La Salle Nat'l Bank. 496 N.E. 2d 3 (111. App. 1986); Ouebe v. Davis. 586 N.E.2d 914 (Ind.
App. 1992). These cases show that when parties to a lease place a covenant to repair upon
a tenant, even if the covenant describes the tenant's obligation as to "keep in repair" or "put
in repair/' this does not entail or envision that the tenant will have to replace portions of the
premises. These cases note that such replacements would not have been within the
contemplation of the parties, and would be a fundamentally unfair burden to impose upon a
tenant. Id.
SLW attempts to distinguish each of these cases. However, it appears that the only
method by which SLW can do so is to argue that each of these courts simply misinterpreted
the respective leases at issue, or to be more exact, failed to interpret the respective leases as
SLW now interprets them. See, e.g., SLWfs Appellate Brief at p. 18 ("the court resorted to
dictionary definitions of the word 'repair* as if the word were used in an entirely different
manner than actually used in the lease agreement"). SLW also attempts to distinguish certain
of these cases because a general repair clause was used between the landlord and tenant
there, instead of one specifying a particular portion of the premises. However, this is another
distinction without a difference. A general covenant to make "all repairs", such as that found

6

in Mobil Oil Credit Corp.. supra, would entail a greater effort on the part of a tenant than one
more limited as in the Lease Agreement at issue. In short, SLW simply does not like the
holdings of the cases cited above. These holdings should guide this court to make a similar
decision - that a covenant to repair does not equate to a covenant to replace, and that the trial
court's decision to the contrary is therefore incorrect as a matter of law.
There are three phrases within Article 4 of the Lease Agreement which describe the
duties of the Griffiths: (1) "Tenant shall maintain" and, (2) "keep in repair" and , (3) "put
into repair where necessary". See Lease Agreement, p.2, R. at 50. None of these phrases
explicitly include "replacements".

Nevertheless, SLW attempts to argue that,

notwithstanding the case law cited by the Griffiths' (as well as common sense) to the
contrary, the ordinary meaning of each of these phrases includes replacement. This simply
is not the case, and certainly is not the "ordinary and usual meaning of the words used."
Warburton. 899 P.2d at 782.
"The plain meaning of maintain or repair is not synonymous with rebuild. 'Repair'
means 'to amend, not to make a new thing'... 'Maintain'does not mean 'rebuild!" Washington
Hydroculture. Inc. v. Payne. 635 P.2d 138 (Wash. 1981) (emphasis added), citing Wattles v.
South Omaha Ice & Coal Co.. 69 N.W. 785 (1897). Other courts agree with this analysis.
"To maintain means to repair or keep in good condition things that exist, and not the creation
of something new." American Trust Co. v. Truck Ins. Exchange. 305 P.2d 73, 74 (Cal. App.
1957). The cases cited by SLW do not state otherwise.

7

SLW cites Friedman v. Le Noir. 241 P.2d 779 (Ariz. 1952), apparently for the
proposition that "maintain" means "replace". However, the Friedman case actually held that
adding something new to the property was not a "repair", but was instead an "alteration". Id.
at 780. Interestingly, a later Arizona decision, Leonardi v. Furman, 316 P.2d 487 (Ariz.
1957), held that the Friedman case did not stand for the proposition that "repair" meant
"restore". In Leonardi. the same court which decided Friedman held that, "there is a clear
distinction between 'repair1 and 'restore1." The court noted that this was particularly true
when both words are used in the same contract. Id. In the Griffiths' contract with SLW, the
words "repair" and "replacements" are used. Compare Article 4 of the Lease Agreement,
R. at 50, with Article 17.5, R. at 55. Therefore, just as in Furman. "this Court is without
authority to reject these words as surplusage". Id. The presence of the word "replacements"
meant that the parties knew how to use this word, as opposed to mere "repairs".
Utah Courts utilize similar interpretative rules. For instance, in Utah State Med.
Ass'n. v. Utah State, et. al.. 655 P.2d 643 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court held that a
promise to keep the premises in good condition did not equate to a promise to rebuild: "the
defendant did not expressly contract to restore the air conditioning system to its original
condition, but rather promised to keep the system in good condition while in the possession
of the premises". Id. at 645. Further, in Home Sav. & Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.. 817
P.2d 341 (Utah App. 1991), the Utah Court of Appeals held that a contract should be
interpreted in manner to harmonize all of its provisions and terms. Therefore, just as in the

8

Furman decision, Utah Courts must not render contractual terms mere "surplusage" through
reconstructive interpretations. Here, the trial court failed to follow this rule in its decision to
grant SLW's Motion for Summary Judgment.
SLW also cites Southeast Banks Trust Co. v. Higginbotham Chevrolet-Oldsmobile.
Inc.. 445 So. 2d 347 (Fla. App. 1984). However, this case also fails to prove SLWfs
argument. In Higginbotham, there was no question as to replacement of the roof, only the
repair of a leak. Furthermore, the question at issue was whether the repair was structural or
not under the terms of the contract. Finally, a/w// trial was held so that the court could
ascertain the intentions of the parties and receive expert opinion as to whether the repair was
structural. Id. at 348, 349. This case only serves to prove that summary judgment is
inappropriate in such a case, like that at hand, where the parties dispute what their intentions
were, and the words of the contract do not necessarily solve this dispute.
Finally, SLW cites Wolfe v. White. 225 P.2d 729 (Utah 1950) for the proposition that
"repair" means "replace". However, this case is inapposite for a number of reasons. First,
the court noted at the beginning of that case that the landlord had submitted an admission to
the court that it had understood its obligation to include "repair and/or replacement of the
roofing material". Id. at 730. Further, this case dealt with a landlord's responsibilities to its
tenants at the beginning of a lease. The court held that, "if the foundation and walls...were
not in good condition for the purposes of the tenancy at the time the lease began, it was the
duty of the lessor, under this covenant, to put the walls and foundation in such condition at
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or before the commencement of the lease and keep them so during the term." Id. at 731. At
trial, a jury found that the lessor provided the lessees with faulty premises from the beginning
of the term, and that the lessor had not fulfilled its duty to put the premises in repair at the
outset. Therefore, according to the terms of the lease, the lessor was responsible to do later
what he should have done at the beginning of the lease. Id. at 731-732.
This is actually similar to the interpretation that the Griffiths had argued before the
trial court, and in their Appellate Brief. Due to the presence of the surrender clause (found
directly below the maintenance clause at paragraph 4.2 of the Lease Agreement), and due to
the ordinary and usual meaning of "put and keep in repair", the only reasonable interpretation
of the Lease Agreement was to find that the Griffiths were responsible to "put" the premises
in repair at the beginning of the lease, and "keep" them so, reasonable wear excepted. See,
e.g, Griffiths Appellate Brief at p.31.1

The Griffiths, in fact, complied with these

requirements, and performed repairs from the beginning of the leasehold until that time when
the roof of the premises could no longer be repaired, but required replacement. It is
undisputed that "reasonable wear" to the roof necessitated its replacement. Therefore,
construing the Lease Agreement against the landlord, Wolfe, P.2d at 732, and applying
reasonable construction to these two provisions, id., the terms of the lease relieve the
Griffiths of any responsibility for replacement of the roof.

*As noted in the Griffiths' Appellate Brief, p. 31, the term "put in repair" generally
means initially, at the beginning of the term. SLWhas not addressed or rebutted this
point.
10

The Griffiths have noted both in their briefs to the trial court and in their Appellate
Brief that a surrender clause modifies a covenant to repair. Shum v. Gaudreau. 562 A.2d
707, 715 (Md. App. 1989); Miller v. Belknap, 266 P.2d 662, 665 (Idaho 1954); Santillanes
v. Property Management Services, 716 P.2d 1360,1364 (Idaho App. 1986). Ironically, SLW
criticizes these cases for not reflecting the "recent" trend in case law considering the subject,
yet, depends on citations from the 1950fs and 1960fs. SLW's citations are not only
antiquated, but inapposite. First, in Avalez Hotel Corp. v. Milner Hotels. 87 So.2d 63 (Miss.
1956), the court was dealing with repairs, not replacement. In fact, this difference was
specifically noted by the court: "if there were extraordinary damage by fire, wind or water
the lessee was not obligated to repair; but this would be damage which resulted in an
unusual, partial or total destruction". Id. at 67 (emphasis added). This also serves to
differentiate Thomas W. Garland. Inc. v. Rubin. 493 S.W.2d 74 (Mo. App. 1973), for, as
noted in Mobil Oil. "Garland... was decided on the basis the repairs were not of a structural
nature". Mobil Oil. 689 S.W.2d at 660.
SLW also argues that the Griffiths seek to leave "no obligation whatsoever for the
Griffiths to maintain the roof, keep the roof in repair, or put the roof in repair" by arguing
that the repair clause is modified by the surrender clause. This simply is not true. The
Griffiths have indeed put the roof into repair, have kept it in repair, and have maintained the
roof. However, after years of rain, wind and snow, the roof had reached the point where it
could no longer be repaired, but needed replacement. This replacement was made necessary
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due to reasonable wear. At this point, the Lease Agreement expressly excepts the Griffiths
from the costs of replacement. All one needs to do is follow the Lease Agreement from
Article 4.1 to Article 4.2 to see that this was the intention of the parties. By arguing
otherwise, it is SLW which is ignoring the terms of the lease, and specifically eviscerating the
surrender provision, in its analysis. When the trial court followed this analysis, it also ignored
Article 4.2, and thereby misinterpreted the Lease Agreement as a matter of law. Utah Valley
Bank v. Tanner. 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-62 (Utah 1981) (each provision of a contract shall be
given effect, with none ignored).
SLW makes it particularly clear that both it and the trial court ignored the surrender
clause of Article 4.2 in part 11(A)(2) of its Appellate Brief. There, SLW claims that the
covenant to put "in repair" envisions a permanent state, and that "usage of the phrase 'in
repair' commits the Griffiths to do whatever is required to keep and put the roof in good,
sound, usable condition without any qualification". See SLW's Appellate Brief, p. 15
(emphasis in original). However, the parties did include such a condition, in the very next
paragraph of the Lease Agreement: "The Premises shall be surrendered...reasonable wear
excepted". See Lease Agreement, Art. 4.2, R. at 50. If SLW is correct, then the surrender
clause means nothing. This was not the intention of the parties, and completely ignores Utah
contract law. Further, to support its assertion that the "only accepted use of the phrase" 'put
in repair' is to describe a state or condition, see SLW's Appellate Brief, p. 16, SLW cites to
three 19th century sources, two of which include Gulliver's Travels and Mark Twain's
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Notebook. Use of these literary references ignores both the fact that the use of language
changes over the centuries, and that none of these sources are recognized legal authority. As
the Griffiths have shown, modem case law interprets the phrase "in repair" differently than
"to replace", and, whether a noun, verb or any other grammatic category, does not require
a tenant to rebuild or restore the landlord's property.
Replacements were not assigned to the Griffiths by the terms of the Lease Agreement.
Instead, as noted in the Griffiths1 Appellate Brief, the only time replacements are mentioned
are in the "repair and deduct" provision of the Lease Agreement in Article 17.5, which
provision envisions that it is SLW which will be taking care of necessary "replacements".
SLW is unable to answer the Griffiths1 question which asks, if "repair" actually means "to
replace", then why is the word "replacement" found within a separate provision of the same
contract?

It is clear that the parties separated repairs from replacements, making the

Griffiths responsible for the former, and, should the need for replacements arise, providing
SLW the mechanism to implement them.
Article 17.5 reads:
Interruption of Services. Interruption or curtailment of any service maintained
in the building of which the Premises form a part, or furnished to the Premises,
if caused by strikes, mechanical difficulties, or any causes beyond Landlord's
control whether similar or dissimilar to those enumerated, shall not entitle
Tenant to any claims against Landlord or to a any abatement in rent, nor shall
the same constitute constructive or partial eviction, unless Landlord fails to
take such measures as may be reasonable in the circumstances to restore the
service without undue delay. If the Premises are rendered unfit in whole or
in part for the uses specified in this Lease Agreement, for a period of more
than ten days, by the making of repairs, replacements or additions, other than
13

those made with Tenant's consent or cause by misuse or neglect by Tenant or
Tenant's agents, servants, customers, visitors or licensees, there shall be a
proportionate abatement of rent during the period of such unfitness.
Lease Agreement, Article 17.5, R. at 55. The parties knew when to use the term
"replacements"; they did not use this term when defining the duties of the Griffiths. Since
any ambiguities must be determined in favor of the Griffiths, there is no basis upon which
SLW can uphold the trial court's determination that under the Lease Agreement, as a matter
of law, the Griffiths are responsible for replacements. Therefore, this Court should reverse
the ruling of the trial court.
IE.

PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY ASSURE THAT THE TRIAL
COURT'S RULING SHOULD BE OVERTURNED.

The Griffiths argue in their Appellate Brief that the trial court ignored their equitable
arguments, and that in doing so, the trial court erred by ruling in favor of SLW as a matter
of law. SLW has argued that the decision of the trial court was, in fact, equitable, and that
the replacements necessitated were foreseeable. This argument ignores the fact that the trial
court's decision was upon a motion for summary judgment, and that all disputed facts must
be decided in favor of the Griffiths. Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp., 755 P.2d at 752. However,
SLW cannot support the trial court's decision without resort to disputed evidence. Therefore,
it becomes obvious that the trial court's decision to grant SLW's Motion for Summary
Judgment was inappropriate.
SLW does not, nor cannot contest that under Utah law, if two conflicting
interpretations of a contract are possible, a court should choose the interpretation which will
14

bring an equitable result. First Sec. Bank of Utah. N.A. v. Maxwell. 659 P.2d 1078, 1081
(Utah 1983). Instead, SLW argues that the trial court's decision was equitable, since the
Griffiths1 "knew, or certainly should have known, that the roof would require replacement
approximately 7 years into their 15-year lease". SLW's Appellate Brief at p. 28. This was
a disputed fact (not to mention extrinsic evidence), which must be decided in favor of the
Griffiths.

Therefore, SLW cannot use the "fact" that replacement of the roof was

"foreseeable" in order to uphold the trial court's decision as an equitable one.
SLW further argues that a court may not rewrite a contract in order to address
concerns of fairness. However, this is not what the Griffiths' argue that this Court should do.
The contract at issue does not state that the Griffiths are responsible for replacements; the
trial court should not have inferred otherwise. Rather, the trial court should have chosen an
interpretation which would have brought about an equitable result, or should have allowed
the parties to prove their intentions at trial. However, to interpret the contract contrary to its
express terms, in a manner which essentially makes the Griffiths the insurers of SLW's
property when such was not intended nor contracted for is simply inequitable, and certainly
inappropriate upon a motion for summary judgment. See Dennison v. Marlowe. 744 P.2d
906 (N.M. 1987) ("for lessees to make extensive long-lasting improvements that could likely
revert to the lessor would be inequitable"); see also Scott v. Prazma. 555 P.2d 571; Mobil
Oil 689 S.W.2d 658. While a sum of nearly $300,000 may not be "enormously expensive"
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to SLW, to the Griffiths it is a substantial sum, and is something for which they never
bargained.
Therefore, the Griffiths do not request that this Court rewrite their contract; rather the
Griffiths request that this Court enforce the contract as written, without redefining terms for
"other" possible meanings. The Griffiths also request that this Court construe the facts in a
light most favorable to the Griffiths, as a court should on a motion for summary judgment,
so that if there is any doubt as to the parties' intentions, such doubts are decided in favor of
the nonmoving party as directed by Utah R. Civ. P. 56. The trial court performed neither of
these tasks. Therefore, its decision should be reversed.
IV.

SLW HAS A DUTY TO REPLACE THE ROOF.

SLW would have this Court uphold the trial court's determination by default: that,
since SLW purportedly has no affirmative duty to replace the roof of the premises, this Court
should affirm the decision to grant SLW's Motion for Summary Judgment. This analysis
fails to take into account SLW's duty under principles of equity, and under the lease itself.
As noted, supra, equity often assigns a duty where absent, unspoken, or unclear from
the terms of a contract. Scott v. Prazma. 555 P.2d 571: Mobil Oil, 689 S.W.2d 658. If the
trier of fact finds that, under the circumstances, it would be inequitable for the tenant to act
as the insurer of the landlords property, or that it would be inequitable for the tenant to
supply to the landlord something better than the original structure, the fact-finder should hold
that the landlord then has a duty to make such replacements. Id. Although this is an
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inappropriate decision to be made upon a motion for summary judgment, it does not mean
that such decision cannot be made at trial. If the trial court assigns such a duty to SLW, it will
be bound by this decision.
Further, SLW simply assumes it does not have a duty to make replacements under the
Lease Agreement. However, the trier of fact may find that, under all the circumstances, and
after learning of the intentions of the parties, that Article 17.5 does contemplate that SLW
will make all replacements. Such a finding would likewise bind SLW.2
Therefore, the common law does not provide SLW the panacea it seeks. A landlord
is no longer able to shun its responsibilities to tenants. Rather, principles of equity and
principles of contract law require that SLW uphold its obligations to the Griffiths. This Court

2

In addition, SLW has ignored the changes in the common law which have
occurred in Utah courts over the last decade. Although SLW cites the case of Wade v.
Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991), it fails to note that the Utah Supreme Court changed
the common law in that case by establishing that a residential landlord owed an implied
duty of habitability, and that the covenant to pay rent was dependent on the lessor's
compliance with that duty. Id. at 1010. This warranty is equally applicable in commercial
leases. Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern. 928 P.2d 368, 376 (Utah 1996). The
Tsern Court noted that Utah cases have progressively shunned the common law,
particularly in the case of Williams v. Melby. 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985) (where the Utah
Supreme Court held that certain property law rules that historically governed the leasing
of land had become obsolete), and that, "the lessee's rights, liabilities and expectations are
more appropriately viewed as governed by contract and general principles of tort law". Id.
at 375. Indeed, the Lease Agreement itself is, in part, a product of this new focus on
contract principles, as Article 17.5 expressly incorporates the right of the tenant to deduct
rent for periods of time when the premises are unfit. Therefore, even if Wolfe v. White
was not distinguishable, its strict adherence to the common law would no longer apply.
17

should see that such obligations are fulfilled by reversing the lower court's decision to grant
SLWs Motion for Summary Judgment, and remanding for trial on the merits.
CONCLUSION
SLW is unable to argue in affirmation of the decision of the trial court without resort
to extrinsic evidence, or evidence which should be weighed in favor of the Griffiths on a
motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, SLW is unable to show that the trial court
correctly interpreted the contract at issue. Finally, SLWs arguments that the common law
protects all landlords from any responsibility for replacements is inaccurate. The Griffiths
should be allowed the benefit of their contract, and at the very least, to prove to a fact-finder
what the parties intended by that contract. For each of these reasons, the decision of the trial
court should be overturned.
DATED t h i s ^ c l a y of April, 1998.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.

Jeffrey L. Silvestrini
Attorneys for the Griffiths
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